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CONCEPT OF SELF AND EXPERIENCED SELF.
BY JESSIE L. PREBLE.
I
HAVE recently been led to the study of the concept of self be-
cause of my search for a fundamental startmg-point in philosophy
which should unite in itself two classes of merits, (1) ability to
hold important place in a logical system of thought, and (2) ability
to call to the mind the concrete impressions which produced it.
The term "self" may be used in many senses. Those enumerated
by Bradley and James cover all the uses I have been accustomed to
notice until recently. And the forms of self under James's "spiritual"
and "material me"^ certainly contain all the ideational data and sense-
impressions which we need to choose between and to mass together
for the formation of our full concept of self. Bradley's analysis
breaks up this group of data and distinguishes several meanings
which can be given to the term "self." (1) It may refer to the
section of consciousness observed during any unit of time we may
choose to select.- (2) It may refer to certain aspects which most
frequently occur throughout life, and which compose what he calls
"the constant average man."^ (3) Some more isolated factor—as
memory or purpose—may be selected from the life stream and called
the "essential self."* Or (6) the self may be contrasted with the
not-self, and regarded as that residue which is left after "the limit
of exchange of content between self and not-self" has been reached.^
Bradley finds no difficulty in dismissing one and all of these con-
ceptions of the self, as vague and untrustworthy because unclear
and undefined. In this he is, to a certain extent, justified because
in things psychical it is probably impossible to draw a rigid line
^Principles of Psychology, Chapter X; Psychology, Briefer Course, Chap-
ter XII.
2 Appearance and Reality, pp. 77-78.
3 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
* Ibid., pp. 80ff.
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of demarcation between the like and the unlike. This difficulty,
however, is found also in the physical world. It is impossible to
measure anything with utter exactness ; it is impossible to place a
plane between two portions of water, one at 51° C and one at 5G° C,
which I propose to add together. Some of the 51° molecules have
lost heat, some of the 50° have gained it, before the addition can
be made. Kinetic activities of the molecules cause them to mix
with a suddenness and i^rregularity which prohibits theoretical or
practical locating of cleavage lines. This indefiniteness of outline
is, of course, a feature of the concept of self, no matter what
attempt to assemble all the images composing the concept might be
made. Our question is, therefore, the following: Is it necessary
to throw over the concept of self because of its indefiniteness ? To
this we may reply: All mental abstraction and generalization are
based upon substitution of a word or a sign for a thing signified.''
"Smoke" is a general term which stands for a possible visual ex-
perience. Here we have what Taine calls a "couple," which may
be written thus: Smoke (verbal percept or image)—^Visual ex-
perience, following, accompanying or preceding. One term in the
couple is a word having a certain sound and a fixed usage in common
experience. At the other end of the couple is the sense-experience. '^
From this consideration, as it now seems to me, a refutation
may be evolved of Bradley's argument against the self-concept on
the ground of its unclearness. For suppose that when you utter the
word "self" and try to utter it in any one of Bradley's seven senses
you are unable to have a clear mental mosaic for any one of them.
Suppose that you become still further disconcerted and thrown into
bewildering unclearness, because for his first concept of self (1)
you have a different mosaic tomorrow from what you had to-day.
Even so, this imaginal unclearness is not decisive proof that you
did not clearly conceive the self. For no single concept is used in
any natural science which always has a setting in precisely the same
imaginal complex. If I explain to you to-day the formula for a
complex lens, 1/u -\- l/v=l/f, I may very clearly image in my
mind's eye the deduction as given in Duff's Physics, and the proof
® Ibid., p. 91. The numeral (6) indicates the place of this concept in
Bradley's unsystematic enumeration of seven uncoordinated and overlapping
concepts of the self. Only the more important of these are here cited.
^ On Intelligence (translation of T. D. Haye, 1872), Chapters I-III, passim.
^ It should be noted that the argument of this paper, though v^rritten on the
basis of a purely verbal theory of the concept, could equally well be carried through
in terms of any one of the doctrines which uphold the view that a concept is
more-than-verbal
.
62 THE OPEN COURT.
will be rapid. In a month, if I have not thought about the proof
at all in the interval, "Duff" may have vanished, yet I trust that by
the knowledge of certain general principles and of the nature of
wave motion I shall still be able to derive this concept and to
relate it to other concepts. We may therefore conclude that, as
the concept l/u, F^=mg, s= z't and the Hke dififer from the cor-
responding concrete experiences, so self as a concept differs from
self as experienced. As a concept it is ^stripped of certain char-
acters—as experienced it cannot be deprived of any characters.
In a word, we may apply Taine's formula to the self, as to the
physical concept, and with the following result: Self, experiencer
and experienced (including not merely "personal attitudes" but also
images and sense-impressions)—^ Self as concept (without fixed
or clear sense-content, yet perfectly definite as to its meaning).
The self is, accordingly, not merely one of the concepts which
can and must be discussed in philosophy ; it is the experienced self.
And since also the self is experiencer as well as experienced it
occupies the unique position (1) of experiencing unit and (2) of
constructor of concepts. It is self which sees, hears, feels, thinks,
takes part in the dramatic episodes of daily life. And it is self,
also, which as thinker (isolating here one factor from the whole
just mentioned) constructs concepts. It seems to follow that from
either point of view, the psychological or the logical, the self con-
stitutes the unavoidable starting point for philosophy.
